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Theory in Search of Practice: The Right of Innocent Passage in the
Territorial Sea
Kissi Agyebeng
Abstract
The evolution of the law of the sea has been shaped largely by two notions, namely,
freedom of navigation on the one hand, and restricted access on the other hand. The
interaction between these two opposing notions has led to the acceptance of two
compromise concepts, namely, the territorial sea and the right of innocent passage.
These concepts have now been codified in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea. This paper examines the right of innocent passage in the territorial sea
under the Law of the Sea Convention regime as matched against contemporary state
practice. It would appear that many coastal states prefer the restriction of this right –
seemingly infringing what the Convention stands for. It is submitted that states should
restructure their policies and regulations to conform to their assumed obligations under
the Convention.

LL.B. (University of Ghana).

Introduction
Throughout the evolution of international law governing the oceans, two theories have
fought for mastery. The first is the notion that the sea is common to all humankind and
open to navigational uses by all. Therefore, no person or nation may validly seek to
restrict others from such use by laying a claim of proprietorship over the sea. This notion
is borne out by the belief that the geophysical nature of the ocean itself resists any claim
of ownership over it. Freedom of navigation is the mantra of this notion.

The second notion seeks to restrict the use of the sea by positing that the sea is amenable
to ownership by persons or states. Thus, whoever may bring any part of the oceans under
his dominion may validly restrict its use by others. The friction between these two
notions has, over the years been, the shaping rod of the law of the sea.

The importance of marine navigation over the centuries and at present cannot be
understated. The oceans serve as a vital link between nations in terms of trade, commerce
and communication. These concerns are the mainstay of the world economy and they
have been the push-and-pull factors in the line of the cross fire between the opposing
forces of freedom of navigation on the one hand, and restricted access on the other hand.

The middle path of the interaction between these two forces is the principle of innocent
passage. After centuries of turbulent evolution, this principle now appears to have
crystallized with its codification in the Law of the Sea Convention.1 The right of innocent

1

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1883 U.N.T.S. 397 [Hereafter referred
to as the LOSC].

1

passage is the essence of marine navigation and at present “[n]o one would seem to
disclaim it. The maritime States cherish it as one of the cornerstones of the law of the sea,
the coastal states admit it as an unavoidable limitation to coastal State competence.”2

However, the exact scope and juridical nature of the right of innocent passage appears to
be far from certain when viewed in the light of contemporary state practice. This is a
sharp reminder that treaty provisions have no independent life of their own except viewed
against prevalent state practice. Though states adopt treaties and normally consider such
treaties as binding, it is not uncommon for these same states to derogate from the treaty
provisions when it is in their interest to do so.

For all intends and purposes, international law appears to be a legal regime governing
state subjects that infringe its tenets only to find justification clothed in self-interest for
the acts which are called in question. In the words of one text writer, “[t]he function of
international law is not to invest States with legal regimes but to secure recognition of
regimes contrived by action of individual members of the community of nations.”3
Therefore, notwithstanding the extent of codification of international law, it is ultimately
accepted state practice, which becomes instructive. The fluid nature of the law of nations
finds revelation in international judicial recognition that:
International law governs relations between independent States. The rules
of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as
expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing
principles of law and established in order to regulate the relations between
these co-existing independent communities or with a view to the
2

K. Hakapää and E.J. Molenaar, Innocent Passage – Past and Present, 23 MARINE POLICY 131 (1999).
D.P. O’Connell, The Juridical Nature of the Territorial Sea, 45 BYIL 303, 304 (1971) [Hereafter cited as
O’Connell, Territorial Sea].
3
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achievement of common aims. Restrictions upon the independence of
States cannot therefore be presumed.4
Indeed, there appears to be no impenetrable shield of codified international law rules and
the law of the sea for that matter.5

The great American judge, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., told us that “[t]he life of the law
has not been logic: it has been experience.”6 If these hallowed words have any force with
respect to domestic law, they find even more potent expression with respect to
international law. The rules of international law develop from theoretical and normative
indices of what is recognized by a majority of states as forming the basis of a valid course
of action. Over time, these rules receive definitive expression of their scope through
codification. However, the interpretation and application of these rules by states become
the path for the further development of these rules.

Therefore, the development of international law is cyclical. Theory begets practice;
practice begets crystallized rules; crystallized rules beget practice, which in turn begets
further theory. Not infrequently, practice deviates from its parent theory and the latter
must of necessity, mutate to espouse the latter.

International law is, therefore, not static. It evolves to meet the challenges of the time
while its path is carved by state practice. Its rules change as long as the conditions that
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The Steamship Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No 10, 18.
Charles E. Pirtle, Military Uses of Ocean Space and the Law of the Sea in the New Millennium, 31 OCEAN
DEVEL. & INT’L L. 7, 10 (2000) [Hereafter cited as Pirtle, Military Uses of Ocean Space].
6
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (Little, Brown & Co. 1881).
5

3

gave rise to them change.7 The law of the sea in particular “remains an active and
dynamic field, changing and growing as the interests of nations change.”8 This
observation applies forcefully to navigational rights, owing to the commercial and
military concerns of maritime states juxtaposed with security and other concerns of
coastal states.

This paper examines the international law right of innocent passage in the territorial sea,9
matched against contemporary state practice. As we have pointed out earlier, the law of
nations “rests on consensus of opinion [and it] may be gradually modified, altered or
extended, in accordance with the views of a considerable majority of…States, as the
consensus of opinion develops.”10 Our aim, therefore, is to match logic with experience
to ascertain the extent to which the latter departs from the former and the implication of
the deviation for the future development of the right of innocent passage in the territorial
sea.

It is important to stress that “[t]he right of innocent passage deserves study from both
historical and contemporary perspectives because of its fundamental importance as the
residual legal regime for securing transit of ships through sovereign seas.”11 The paper is
divided into 3 parts. Part I looks at the history and evolution of the right of innocent
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John Wilkinson, The First Declaration of the Freedom of the Seas: The Rhodian Sea Law, in 2 OCEAN
YEARBOOK, 89, 90 (Borgese and Guinsburg eds., 1980) [Hereafter cited as Wilkinson, The Rhodian Sea
Law].
8
Bowen L. Florsheim, Territorial Sea, 3000 – Year Old Question, 36 J. AIR L. & COM. 73, 75 (1970)
[Hereinafter cited as Florsheim, 3000-Year Old Question].
9
This right also exists in straits used for international navigation and what is known as archipelagic waters.
10
The Lotus Case, supra note 4 at 34.
11
David Froman, Uncharted Waters: Non-innocent Passage of Warships in the Territorial Sea, 21 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 625, 628 (1984) [Hereinafter cited as Froman, Uncharted Waters].
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passage in the territorial sea. Part II is a descriptive analysis of the regime of innocent
passage under the LOSC. Attention is drawn to the interpretation and implementation
challenges posed by the provisions of the LOSC. Part III examines contemporary state
practice as reflected mainly in national legislations. This is followed by concluding
remarks.

Part I – Innocent Passage in the Territorial Sea – Down Memory Lane
Innocent passage implies that such passage is at the sufferance of the state through whose
coastal waters the right is exercised. It may also be said that there can be no talk of
innocence if passage is not subject to the sovereignty of the state whose shores are
adjacent to the body of water in which the right is exercised. For where no sovereignty is
exercised by any state over the body of water in question, passage through same would be
passage simpliciter, with no consideration of its (in)offensiveness. For instance, there is
nothing like innocent passage on the high seas since no state may validly claim to
exercise jurisdiction over this body of water.

The exercise of sovereign rights over portions of the sea necessitating the notion of
innocent passage in it has been the most turbulent area in the evolution of the law of the
sea. One author pointedly remarks that:
The history of the Law of the Sea has been dominated by a central and
persistent theme – the competition between the exercise of governmental
authority over the sea and the idea of the freedom of the seas. The tension
between these has waxed and waned through the centuries, and has
reflected the political, strategic and economic circumstances of each
particular age. When one or two great commercial powers have been
dominant or have achieved parity of power, the emphasis has lain upon the
liberty of navigation and the immunity of shipping from local

5

control…When, on the other hand, great powers have been in decline or
have been unable to impose their wills upon smaller states, or when an
equilibrium of power has been attained between a multiplicity of States,
the emphasis has lain upon the protection and reservation of maritime
resources, and consequently upon the assertion of local authority over the
seas.12
It appears that in antiquity the sea was open to all for the purpose of navigation. Dated
writers like Ulpian and Celsus had no inhibition on this point. While the former asserted
mare quod naturia omnibus patet – the sea is open to everybody by nature, the latter
affirmed maris communem usum omnibus ut aeria – the sea, like the air, is common to all
mankind.13 More recently, Vattel observed that:
It is manifest that the use of the open sea, which consists in navigation and
fishing, is innocent and inexhaustible; that is, he who navigates, or fishes
in it, does no injury to any one, and that the sea, in these two respects, is
sufficient for all mankind; since, every one being able to find in their state
of communion what was sufficient to supply their wants, to undertake to
render themselves sole masters of them, and exclude all others, would be
to deprive them, without reason, of the benefits of nature.14
These claims have not gone without challenge, for a counterclaim has been maintained of
the possibility of appropriation of portions of the sea and hence its uncommonness. The
origins of this opposing view may be traced to the theory of the Glossators who espoused
the canon law of Rome.15 They founded a theoretical basis upon which they vested
sovereign rights over the sea in the Roman Emperor.16 However, with the emergence of
the ius gentium – law of nations, it was reasserted that the sea existed for free access to
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D.P. O’Connell, Transit Rights and Maritime Strategy, 123 RUSI II (1978), quoted in Pirtle, Military
Uses of Ocean Space, supra note 5 at 36.
13
Cited in Ruth Lapidoth, Freedom of Navigation – Its Legal History and its Normative Basis, 6 J. MAR.
L. & COM. 259, 261 (1975) [Hereafter cited as Lapidoth, Freedom of Navigation].
14
M.D. VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS – Book I Ch. XXIII Sec. 281, 185 ( P.H. Nicklin & T. Johnson
1829) [Hereafter cited as VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS].
15
Percy Thomas Fenn, Jr., Origins of the Theory of Territorial Waters, 20 AJIL 465, 465 (1926) [Hereafter
cited as Fenn, Origins].
16
Ibid.
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all men.17 In the words of Judge Story in the Marianna Flora, “[u]pon the ocean, in time
of peace, all possess an entire equity. It is the common highway of all, appropriated to the
use of all, and no one can vindicate to himself a superior or exclusive prerogative
there.”18 Thus, the battle line was drawn between the proponents of freedom of
navigation and those of restricted and regulated access.

These two loggerhead positions were carried down the course of history. The Rhodians of
the Hellinistic age fought unrelentlessly on the side of freedom of navigation to protect
their maritime interests and to oppose Mediterranean power hegemony.19 This led to the
famous Rhodian Sea Law which was applied on the Island of Rhodes,20 and which is said
to be the earliest known comprehensive code of the law of the sea.21

By the 13th century, it had been recognized that a state may exercise jurisdiction over the
body of water adjacent to its shores.22 The notion of restricted access to the sea was also
engendered by feudalism, the immense “rights and powers [of which] would naturally
produce in the mind of the ruler possessing them a sense of proprietorship of the things
over which he exercised them.”23

17

Ibid.
Quoted in Pirtle, Military Uses of Ocean Space, supra note 5 at 13.
19
Wilkinson, The Rhodian Sea Law, supra note 7 at 91.
20
William Tetley, The General Maritime Law – The Lex Maritima, 20 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 105,
109 (1994).
21
Florsheim, 3000-Year Old Question, supra note 8 at 76.
22
RUTH LAPIDOTH, FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL
WATERWAYS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 14 (Jerusalem Post Press 1975) [ Hereafter cited as LAPIDOTH,
INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS].
23
Fenn, Origins, supra note 15 at 469.
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Over the ages, several states have laid claim to vast expanses of the sea.24 The Republic
of Venice, at the peak of its glory, laid claim to the Adriatic Sea while Genoa laid claim
to the Ligurian Sea.25 Perhaps the most notorious pretensions of ownership of the seas
were the 15th century claims by Spain and Portugal to almost the entirety of the oceans.
These claims were based on a donationis Pontificiae (Papal bull) decreed by Pope
Alexander VI on 4 May 1493, by which he purported to donate the Western and Eastern
Hemispheres to Spain and Portugal respectively, by drawing an imaginary line from the
Artic pole to the Antarctic pole!26

Such sweeping claims, of course, did not pass without opposition and challenge. For
instance, in response to a Spanish complaint against the voyage of Sir Francis Drake to
the Pacific, Queen Elizabeth I remarked: “The use of the sea and air is common to all;
neither can any title to the ocean belong to any people or private man, for as much as
neither nature nor regard of the public use permitteth any possession thereof.”27

Intellectual discourse on the issue came to a head in the 17th century by virtue of the
legal expositions of the Dutchman, Hugo Grotius, fighting on the side of freedom of
navigation, and the Englishman, John Selden, holding the fort for restricted sea access. In
his treatise in support of Dutch trading interests in the East Indies, Grotius argued that it
would be contrary to natural law to inhibit free navigation.28 This is because, “the sea can
24

Lapidoth, Freedom of Navigation, supra note 13 at 261.
Ibid.
26
E.G. Bourne, The Demarcation Line of Alexander VI: An Episode of the Period of Discoveries, in YALE
REVIEW 35, 35 (1892-93).
27
Quoted in LAPIDOTH, INTERNATIONAL WATER WAYS, supra note 22 at 15.
28
HUGO GROTIUS, MARE LIBERUM SIVE DE LURE QUOD BATAVIS COMPETIT AD INDICANA COMERCIA,
DISSERTATO – THE FREEDOM OF THE HIGH SEAS OR THE RIGHT WHICH BELONGS TO THE DUTCH TO
25
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in no way become the private property of any one, because nature not only allows but
enjoins its common use. Neither can the shore become private property of anyone.”29
Therefore, he concludes that not only are we not to prevent the free use of the oceans, but
we are indeed “bound to assist navigation in whatever way we can, when it can be done
without any prejudice to ourselves.”30

Selden took issue with Grotius by writing in defence of the British Monarch’s proprietary
claims to expanses of the sea around the British Isles. He drew inspiration from similar
claims made previously by the British and other states through the course of history. He
asserted that the “Law of God, or the divine Oracles of Holy Scripture, do allow a
Dominion of the Sea.”31

Freedom of the seas, with its necessary notion of freedom of navigation has been
recognized since the 18th century.32 Since then it appears that Grotius’ open seas has
triumphed over Selden’s closed seas. In the colourful words of James Brown Scott:
In this battle of books, to use the happy expression of Professor Nys, the
Dutch Scholar has had the better part of his English antagonist. If it cannot
be said that Grotius wears his learning “lightly like flower” the treatise of
Selden is, in comparison, over-freighted with it; the Mare Liberum is still
an open book, the Mare Clausum is indeed a closed one, and as flotsam or
jetsam on troubled waters [the former] rides the waves, whereas its rival,
heavy and water-logged, has gone under.33

TAKE PART IN THE EAST INDIAN TRADE 55 (Oxford University Press 1916) (1608) [Hereafter cited as
GROTIUS, MARE LIBERUM].
29
Ibid. at 30.
30
Ibid.
31
JOHN SELDEN, MARE CLAUSUM SEU DE DOMINIO MARIS – OF THE DOMINION, OR, OWNERSHIP OF THE
SEA 99 (Arno Press, 1972) (1652) [Hereafter cited as SELDEN, MARE CLAUSUM].
32
Lapidoth, Freedom of Navigation, supra note 13 at 268.
33
James Brown Scott, Introductory Note to GROTIUS, MARE LIBERUM, supra note 28 at ix.
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Two principles, standing side-by-side, emerged from the contest between open seas and
closed seas proponents. The results of compromise more than any other consideration,
these principles are now firmly recognized in the law of the sea. The first is the principle
of territorial sea, which was accepted at the time of the recognition of freedom of the
seas, but “[f]or nearly two centuries following the acceptance of freedom of the seas, the
questions of what areas of the sea were in fact subject to national control continued to be
debated.”34

The principle of territorial sea arose out of the need to suppress piracy and to promote
navigation and commerce between states.35 Most importantly, a state extended its
jurisdiction over the marginal waters abutting its coastline for security reasons – “as a
safety perimeter since it was preferable to keep attacking enemies at sea rather than suffer
an invasion on land.”36 In the words of Elihu Root:
The sovereign of the land washed by the sea asserted a new right to protect
his subjects and citizens against attack, against invasion, against
interference and injury, to protect their revenues, to protect their health, to
protect their industries. This is the basis and the sole basis on which is
established the territorial sea.37
The territorial sea was conceptually regarded as an extension of the territorial land mass –
a natural prolongation of the land subsumed under the superjacent waters. It has been
asserted over the centuries that “[e]very Prince, whose Country adjoins to the Sea…has

34

Florsheim, 3000-Year Old Question, supra note 8 at 79, citing Heizen, Three-Mile Limit: Preserving the
Freedom of the Seas, 11 STAN. L. REV. 597, 597 (1959).
35
Fenn, Origins, supra note 15 at 471.
36
W. L. Schacte, Jr., The History of the Territorial Sea from a National Security Perspective, 1
TERRITORIAL SEA J. 143, 148 (1990) [Hereafter cited as Schacte, History of the Territorial Sea].
37
Oral arguments in the XI Proceedings of the North Atlantic Fisheries Case Arbitration, 1910 (Great
Britain v. United States of America), U.N. Rep. Vol XI, p.67, quoted in Schacte, History of the Territorial
Sea, ibid. at 14.
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some portion of the Sea belonging to him in property, as an accession of the Land, or
appendant to it, or rather incorporated with it, like Veins and Arteries, integral Parts of
the same Body.”38

Indeed, Grotius, the champion of freedom of navigation himself, admits that though the
sea is common to all and cannot be appropriated by a person or a people, “[t]he following
qualification, however, must be made. If any part of [the sea] is by nature susceptible of
occupation, it may become the property of the one who occupies it only so far as such
occupation does not affect its common use.”39

The territorial sea seems to be a misnomer since, rather than being a natural prolongation
of the land mass, the body of water the term refers to appears to be a natural landward
flow of the open seas. However, other grounds, other than it being a natural projection of
the territorial land mass and hence susceptible to ownership, have been found to buttress
the exercise of jurisdiction over the territorial sea.

O’Connell explains that with the development of the abstract theory of the state:
Territory ceased to be regarded as something owned, and it came to be
regarded as a spatial area within which the faculties of sovereignty could
be exercised. Police powers could be exercised outside this spatial area to
the extent that international law permitted, and hence jurisdiction ceased
to be spatially coterminous with territory…The philosophy that had
initially legitimized exclusive rights to the sea had been sapped, and it had
left as a residue the territorial sea, which was now explicable on quite

38

MEDOWS, OBSERVATION CONCERNING THE DOMINION AND SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SEAS 42 (1689),
quoted in O’Connell, Territorial Sea, supra note 3 at 309.
39
GROTIUS, MARE LIBERUM, supra note 28 at 30.
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different premises. No longer was it necessary to regard the territorial sea
as part of the national domain.40
In recent times jurisdiction over the territorial sea has been asserted for health, safety and
welfare reasons,41 together with concerns of pollution and customs control and national
security.42 These concerns are said to “reflect recognition that conduct in coastal waters is
inextricably linked with the protection and promotion of societal values ashore.”43

From the 1930 Hague Codification Conference44 through the 1958 Territorial Sea
Convention45 to the LOSC, the territorial sea has now become firmly established in the
law of the sea, as a belt of sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured
from baselines along the coast of a state.46 The coastal state exercises exclusive
sovereignty over its bed and subsoil.47

The second principle that emerged from the friction between open seas and closed seas is
that of the right of innocent passage. It is “a development concomitant to the emergence
of coastal state sovereign control over the territorial sea”48 arising “from the dialectic of
claim and counterclaim in a world of few powerful actors and infinite resources.”49

40

O’Connell, Territorial Sea, supra note 3 at 325.
Schacte, History of the Territorial Sea, supra note 36 at 147.
42
Ibid. at 143.
43
Ibid. at 147.
44
L of N. Doc.C. 74, M.39.1929 V.
45
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
46
LOSC, supra note 1, article 3.
47
Ibid. article 2.
48
Zou Keyuan, Innocent Passage for Warships: The Chinese Doctrine and Practice, 29 OCEAN DEVEL. &
INT’L L. J. 195, 197 (1998).
49
Froman, Uncharted Waters, supra note 11 at 689.
41

12

The right of innocent passage owes its true basis to the promotion of trade, commerce and
communication between states. Therefore, even though the coastal state exercises
juridical rights over its territorial sea, ships of foreign nations may navigate through such
sovereign waters as long as navigation is non-provocative. The normative basis of this
right is explained through the inter-dependence between states and the undisputable fact
that no single nation can claim to be so self-sufficient as not to need input from other
states – input which is mostly carried aboard ships across the oceans. In the words of
Phillip Medows:
As it is a way, it is common to the peaceable traders of all nations. And
this is so far from being a damage to any, that is highly beneficial to all,
for there is no man so self sufficient as not to need the continual help of
another, so neither is there any country which does not at some time or
other need the growth and productions of another.50
The development of the right of innocent passage was largely influenced by Grotius’
Mare Liberum. According to him the right is an “unimpeachable axiom of the Law of
Nations, called a primary rule or first principle, the spirit of which is self-evident and
immutable, to wit: Every nation is free to travel to every other nation, and to trade with
it.”51

This passionate defence of the right of innocent passage was only a foretaste of his later
justification of the slaying of the Amorites by the Israelites of the Mosaic era, for the
denial by the former of the latter of innocent passage through their land! This is because

50
51

Quoted in C.J. COLUMBUS, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA, 6th ed., 63 (Longmans 1967).
GROTIUS, MARE LIBERUM, supra note 28 at 7.
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in that case, innocent passage was “a right which according to the Law of Human Society
ought in all justice to have been allowed.”52

It is instructive to note that Selden, the champion of closed seas, admitted expressly the
existence of the right of innocent passage in the words, “the offices of humanity require,
that entertainment be given to Strangers, and that inoffensive passage be not denied
them.” 53

Indeed, the recognition of the right of innocent passage is self-evident in common sense
and practicality. Aside of the fact that inter-dependence between states makes it an
imperative, the right must of necessity exist in the territorial sea because “[t]hough
freedom of navigation applies on the high seas, it would have been useless and
ineffectual if a right of access to and from the open sea and between different parts of it
had not been recognized as well.”54

The right of innocent passage is in effect a balance of the interest of maritime states on
the one hand and that of coastal states on the other hand. The interests of the former lie in
the preservation of navigational freedoms while those of the latter lie in the preservation
of security interests. In the words of one author, this “delicate balance between the
security and other interests of the coastal state, and the interest of the international
community in free and unimpeded navigation is therefore the backbone of the right of

52

Ibid. at 9.
SELDEN, MARE CLAUSUM, supra note 31 at 123.
54
Lapidoth, Freedom of Navigation, supra note 13 at 259.
53
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innocent passage.”55 But it must be borne in mind that depending on the circumstances, a
maritime state may be a coastal state while a coastal may be a maritime state.56 This
probable twist-of-fate factor fosters the compromise of the recognition of the right of
innocent passage.

The right of innocent passage, therefore, exists as a limitation on and as an exception to
absolute coastal state sovereignty in the territorial sea. It is “the only exception of any
importance”57 and it “is not a “gift” of the coastal state to passing vessels but a limitation
on its sovereignty in the interests of international intercourse.”58 The interaction of the
forces of closed seas and open seas has, in sum, produced the following result:
Those parts of the sea, thus subject to [the coastal] state, are
comprehended in its territory; no one can navigate in them in spite of that
nation. But it cannot refuse access to vessels not suspected, for uses,
without violating its duty; every proprietor being obliged to grant a
passage to strangers, even by land.59
We have attempted a consideration of the historical antecedents and the theoretical basis
of the right of innocent passage. In the next part we will examine its juridical scope as
codified in the LOSC.

Part II – Innocent Passage in the Territorial Sea under the LOSC
The LOSC is largely touted as the constitution of the oceans. It is intended to settle all
issues relating to the law of the sea. An attempt is made in the LOSC to regulate the right
55

FRANCIS NGANTCHA, THE RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE LAW OF THE
SEA 2 (Pinter Publishers 1990).
56
Ibid. at 199.
57
Tullio Treves, Navigation, in A HANDBOOK ON THE NEW LAW OF THE SEA, vol 2 835, 906 (Dupuy and
Vignes, eds., 1991) [Hereafter cited as Treves, Navigation].
58
W.E. Butler, Innocent Passage and the 1982 Convention: The Influence of Soviet Law and Policy, 81
AJIL 331, 331 (1987).
59
VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 14 at 188.
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of innocent passage in the territorial sea vis-à-vis the interests and sovereignty of the
coastal state.

Like all human creations, the provisions of the LOSC on innocent passage are not
without blemish. Inexactness and imperfection of language often render the provisions
vague or ambiguous. It also seems that the draftsman sometimes find virtue in vagueness
and ambiguity. Then again, even where the provisions are manifestly clear, states have
shown themselves capable of creating ambiguity where none exists. As a result, several
issues are left hanging without definite answers – issues for which contemporary state
practice would undoubtedly help to shape.

a) The Regime
i) General Rules
Innocent passage implies that navigation through coastal waters of a state by a foreign
ship is peaceful and not offensive. In the territorial sea, “ships of all States, whether
coastal or land-locked, enjoy the right of innocent passage.”60 The definition of passage
poses no difficulty. The focus is on the purpose of navigation through the territorial sea
more than anything else. Thus, a ship may pass through the territorial sea without
entering internal waters or call at a port facility outside such waters. Conversely, a ship
may enter or proceed from internal waters or call at a port facility outside such waters.61

60
61

LOSC, supra note 1, article 17.
Article 18(1).
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However, “ships are not allowed to ‘hover’ or cruise around in the territorial sea,
because, regardless of whether or not they are ‘innocent’, they would not be engaged in
passage.”62 Therefore, passage is required to be continuous and expeditious.63 However,
ships are permitted to “hover” in the territorial sea for the purpose of stoppage or
anchorage incidental to ordinary navigation, or when rendered necessary by force
majeure, distress or for rendering assistance to persons or crafts in danger.64

Innocence is negatively defined as passage that is not prejudicial to the peace, good order
or security of the coastal state.65 Bearing in mind that these indices are highly subjective,
an attempt is made to enhance objectivity by providing a laundry list under article 19(2),
the engagement in which would render passage non-innocent.66 It is arguable that the use
of words like ‘propaganda’ and the open-ended formulation in sub-paragraph (l) suggest
that what constitutes innocent passage is at once objective and subjective.
62
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embodied in the Charter of the United nations;
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(l) any other activity no having a direct bearing on passage.
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Article 19 also suggests that there is a presumption of innocence until the opposite is
established by whoever asserts it. This is because there is no requirement in the tenor of
this article for ships to show that their passage is innocent before being allowed through
the territorial sea. It also appears that whether or not a ship is in innocent passage is to be
objectively determined from the manner and objects appertaining to such passage.

However, it is not clear whether it is factual non-innocence alone which suffices or
whether notional non-innocence would also do. For this purpose, factual non-innocence
is where a ship actually engages in any of the proscribed activities under article 19(2).
Notional non-innocence, on the other hand, is where a ship is reasonably suspected of
future commission of any of the proscribed acts.

The options of counter actions available to states would depend on how states interpret
article 19. Where factual non-innocence alone is favoured, states would have to adopt a
‘wait-and-see’ approach to preventing non-innocent passage. On the other hand, where
notional non-innocence is also entertained, states may resort to preemptive action to
prevent reasonably suspected non-innocent passage. But the chapeau of article 19(2)
tends to favour factual non-innocence. However, in these uncertain days of terrorist
attacks and counter-terrorist measures, it would be naive to assume that notional noninnocence would not be favoured by states to buttress their taking of preemptive
measures.67

67
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ii) Coastal States’ Legislative Powers
There has never been absolute freedom of navigation through the territorial sea. Selden
pointedly remarked that “it is most evident from the [c]ustoms of all times, that free
passage (as they call it) is wont ever to be so limited by Princes in their [t]erritories, that
it is permitted or prohibited according to the various concernments of the public good.”68
Today the right of innocent passage exists not at the pleasure of princes. It is restricted by
the LOSC, which vests in the coastal state the right of regulation.

Through laws and regulations, the coastal state may protect its interests in the territorial
sea.69 Such interests include the safety of navigation and regulation of maritime traffic;
protection of cables, pipelines and navigational aids; the conservation and preservation of
marine environment and its living resources; and the prevention, reduction and control of
pollution; marine scientific research and hydrographic surveys; and customs, fiscal,
immigration or sanitary concerns.70

rights activists, was headed to East Timor to protest against human rights violations in the region and to
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Regulatory measures are not to apply to the design, construction, manning or equipment
of ships, other than in accordance with international standards.71 However, foreign ships
exercising the right of innocent passage are obliged to comply with the laws and
regulations of the coastal state.72

The right of innocent passage appears not to be exercisable in all parts of the territorial
sea. The coastal state is mandated to require foreign ships passing through its territorial
sea to use sea lanes and to observe any traffic separation scheme in force.73 The
designation of such schemes must, however, take into consideration the recommendations
of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), together with density of traffic, special
characteristics of ships, and any channels customarily used for international navigation.74

The legislative powers of the coastal state introduces a doubt as to whether a violation by
a ship of the coastal state’s laws or regulations of itself would render passage noninnocent. By defining non-innocent passage with reference to the interests of the coastal
state, it would appear that violations of coastal state laws and regulations may be held to
render passage non-innocent since such violations would be clearly provocative.

Whatever be the case, it is not in doubt that article 19(2)(1) and article 21 gives the
coastal state a wide latitude to characterize passage as non-innocent based on its caprices.
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Terms like ‘peace’, ‘good order’ and ‘security’ are highly fluid and susceptible to varying
interpretations despite the attempt to inject objectivity in their interpretation.

iii) Rights and Duties of the Coastal State
If power is vested in the coastal state to regulate innocent passage, then the right of
enforcement of the rules must of necessity be reserved in the coastal state. The one
implies the other. For this cause, the police powers of the coastal state are called into
force by article 25, which permits it to take the necessary steps to prevent non-innocent
passage in the territorial sea. In particular, the coastal state may take necessary steps to
prevent breaches of conditions attached to the admissions of ships to internal waters or
call at a port facility outside internal waters.

Article 25 strongly suggests that the violation by a ship of the rules and regulations of the
coastal state simpliciter would render its passage through the territorial sea non-innocent.
What is of more concern here is that, there appears to be no guiding rule regarding the
steps that may be taken by the coastal state to prevent non-innocent passage. Preventive
measures are placed in the singular bossom of the coastal state. Perhaps the only
definitive limitation on the enforcement powers of the coastal state is the prohibition of
the levying of charges upon foreign ships by reason only of their presence in the
territorial sea.75 Even then, the use of the hortatory ‘may’ in that article, instead of the
mandatory ‘shall’, suggests that the coastal state may levy charges upon foreign ships
passing through its territorial sea for no service provided.
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Power is also reposed in the coastal state to suspend innocent passage in specified areas
of the territorial sea.76 Such suspension must be in pursuance of the protection of the
coastal state’s security and it must not be discriminatory among foreign ships in form or
in fact.77 This provision does not mandate the suspension of innocent passage by the
coastal state in the entirety of its territorial sea. However, the maximum duration of such
suspension is open to debate since no upper limit is specified. Consequently, it is possible
that in practice, temporary suspension of innocent passage in parts of the territorial sea
will easily have the effect of permanence since the coastal state cannot be challenged
with respect to the duration.

However, the legislative and enforcement powers of the coastal state are not writ large.
The traditional delicate balance between freedom of navigation and restricted access is
preserved by the LOSC. Thus however extensive its regulatory rules may be, the coastal
state is precluded from adopting measures which have the practical effect of denying or
impairing the right of innocent passage through its territorial sea.78 A negative duty is
also placed upon the coastal state not to discriminate between ships on the basis of
nationality or cargo.79 Then again, a positive duty exists for coastal states to “give
appropriate publicity to any danger to navigation within its territory, of which it has
knowledge.”80
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It is not clear from the LOSC whether this duty arises only in respect of actual knowledge
of the existence of any danger to navigation or whether the duty also arises in respect of
imputed or constructive knowledge – that is so say, where the coastal state in question
would be deemed to know of the existence to impediments to navigation. On this point,
we may take inspiration from the Corfu Channel Case,81 where it was held in effect that a
state may be held liable for damage arising from a danger in its territorial waters and the
existence of which it ought reasonably to have known. The proof of such knowledge
“may be drawn from inferences of fact, provided that they leave no room for reasonable
doubt.”82

However, in the absence of any enforcement mechanism in the LOSC, it is doubtful
whether the coastal state may be made to pay reparation to a foreign shipping interest that
has suffered damage resulting from a default of the latter in warning the shipping public
of the existence of mortal dangers to navigation in its territorial waters.

b) Innocent Passage of Different Types of Ships
i) Ships with Special Characteristics
Certain ships, including nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying nuclear and other ultra
hazardous substances, by nature, pose grave environmental concerns to the states in
whose waters they traverse. Such ships are required to carry documents and observe
special precautionary measures to be established by international agreements.83 Thus, the
true scope of the regime of innocent passage for such ships has been pushed into the
81
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future. Perhaps the only determinate rule with respect to such ships, including tankers, is
that, they may be required by the coastal state to confine their passage to designated sea
lanes.84

ii) Merchant Ships
The coastal state may assume civil or criminal jurisdiction over foreign merchant ships,
and government ships operated for commercial purposes, in its territorial waters, under
prescribed circumstances. It must be pointed out at the onset that the general rule is that
the flag state has exclusive jurisdiction with respect to occurrences on board a ship.
However, the coastal state reserves the right to arrest or levy execution upon foreign
merchant vessels in its territorial waters for the purposes of civil proceedings.85 Such
execution may only be in respect of obligations or liabilities assumed or incurred by the
ship while passing through the territorial waters.86 So for instance, execution may be
levied for services rendered to the ship in the territorial sea, like pilotage or for damage to
say, navigational aids or cables.

The exercise of civil jurisdiction by the coastal state over foreign vessels in its territorial
sea appears to be focused on in rem maritime claims and not on in personam causes. This
is because the coastal state is precluded from stopping or diverting a ship in its territorial
sea for the purpose of exercising civil jurisdiction in relation to persons on board the
ship.87 Moreover, if we step out of the LOSC, article 2(2) of the Convention on the Arrest
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of Ships88 states that “[a] ship may only be arrested in respect of a maritime claim but in
respect of no other claim.” However, the ‘without prejudice’ formulation in paragraph 3
of article 28 of the LOSC, suggests that the coastal state may arrest or levy execution
upon foreign ships in its territorial waters for other civil claims also.

With respect to criminal jurisdiction, it seems that the coastal state may exercise it fully
upon foreign merchant ships proceeding from its internal waters to its territorial sea.89
However, the coastal state’s criminal jurisdiction is restricted where a ship is only passing
through the territorial sea without entering internal waters or calling at a port facility.
Here the coastal state may assume jurisdiction where the consequences of the crime
extend to the coastal state; or it is of such a kind as to disturb its peace or good order of
the territorial sea; or if the exercise of jurisdiction has been requested by the master of the
ship or operatives of the flag state; or if it is necessary for the suppression of illicit drug
trafficking.90

It appears that there is very little restriction on the exercise of jurisdiction by the coastal
state in respect of crimes committed on board foreign merchant ships passing through its
territorial waters. This is because article 27(1) leaves a wide door open for the coastal
state to assume such jurisdiction at the least opportunity. This stems from the fact that it
is only the coastal state which can determine whether or not the consequences of a crime
extends to it, or is of a kind as to disturb its peace or good order, not to mention the
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nebulous nature of these formulations. This feature engenders a high degree of
subjectivity and unilateral action.

Thus, in principle the coastal state is restricted from assuming jurisdiction over every
crime committed on board foreign merchant ships in the territorial waters. However, the
coastal state may not feel that restricted owing to the wide latitude in the tenor of the
relevant provisions. But where the crime is committed before the ship enters the
territorial sea, paragraph 5 of article 27 exhorts the coastal state not to intervene, except
where the crime is in violation of rules regarding its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), or
rules for the protection and preservation of the marine environment.

iii) Warships
Special provisions apply to warships and other government ships operated for noncommercial purposes, owing to the traditional immunity such ships enjoy and affirmed to
that effect by article 32. Warship, under the LOSC, is a term of art. It is defined in article
29 as:
a ship belonging to the armed forces of a state bearing the external marks,
distinguishing such ships of its nationality, under the command of an
officer duly commissioned by the government of the State and whose
name appears in the appropriate service list or its equivalent, and manned
by a crew which is under regular armed forces discipline.
This implies that a ship belonging to an insurgent, nationalist or rebel movement and
used for the purposes of warfare, does not qualify as a warship under the LOSC. This is
because such a movement is not a state and, therefore, a ship belonging to it neither
belongs to a state nor is it manned by a crew under regular armed forces discipline. Also
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such a ship would not be under the command of a duly commissioned officer whose
name appears on the service list.

The rule with respect to submarines is that they must navigate on the surface in the
territorial sea while showing their flag.91

Since the coastal state cannot assume jurisdiction, civil or criminal, over foreign
warships, it may only require such ships to leave the territorial sea, where they engage in
non-innocent passage or refuse to comply with its laws and regulations concerning
innocent passage therein.92

It is expected that in principle the foreign warship in question would leave the territorial
sea of the coastal state after having been asked to leave under such circumstances. But if
the warship in question lingers on in the territorial sea after being asked to leave, the
result would be anybody’s guess. The flag state is obliged to make good any loss or
damage to the coastal state, which is attributable to a warship, or other ship operated for
non-commercial purposes belonging to it.93

The foregoing shows that the right of innocent passage does not apply equally to all
ships. The incidents (rights and responsibilities) of this right are determined by the nature
of the ship in question and the purpose of its use. It also shows that the LOSC “seeks to
maintain a balance between the right of a coastal state to enact appropriate laws and
91
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regulations dealing with innocent passage and the maintenance of the right in instances of
overbearing coastal State laws.”94 However, the pendulum appears to swing in favour of
coastal state regulation, when viewed against the reality that the existence of innocent
passage invariably connotes the danger of non-innocent passage,95 thereby requiring
extensive regulation.

c) Hanging Issues
There are several open textured provisions on the issue of innocent passage that lend
themselves to varying interpretation and, therefore, leave several questions without
definite answers. The main provision on what constitutes non-innocent passage – article
19(1) – is fluid enough to admit the incorporation of several activities not listed in article
19(2). For instance, subparagraph (h) of envisages non-innocent passage resulting from
the engagement in “willful and serious pollution”. Willful speaks of volition. However,
the gravity of the pollution which would render passage non-innocent is far from clear.
The word “serious” is coloured by relativity and would always depend, for its meaning,
on the singular interpretation of the coastal state.

Another nagging issue related to the above is that though the coastal state is obliged not
to hamper innocent passage, it is also obliged to protect and preserve the marine
environment and its resources.96 The concern here is the extent to which the coastal state
may restrict innocent passage for environment-based reasons. This concern is especially
pressing for states with ecologically sensitive marine environments and who have set up
94

Rothwell, Lusitania Expresso, supra note 67 at 433.
Froman, Uncharted Waters, supra note 11 at 657.
96
Part XII of LOSC.
95

28

marine protected areas97 in their territorial waters. It has been suggested that the preferred
solution may be to regulate speed, anchorage and the imposition of routing measures in
such areas.98 Nevertheless, the seeming absence of a true guidance on this issue is a cause
for concern.

Aside from actual pollution, a related question is whether the mere presence of certain
ships in the territorial sea renders their passage therein non-innocent. Nuclear-powered
ships and ships carrying nuclear or other ultra hazardous substances fall into this
category. This issue arises from the practical consideration that the cargo carried by such
ships constitutes grave environmental danger to coastal states since they are capable of
producing almost permanent radioactive contamination of the marine environment.99
Indeed, there are no salvage measures in existence in the event of a spill of these noxious
substances.100

Ships carrying casks of plutonium are of the greatest concern. It is known that “[a]
minuscule amount will cause fatal cancer, and if a transport accident occurred, plutonium
could be released to the environment and would remain a deadly contaminant for tens of
thousands of years.”101 On another level, there is the environmental damage risk posed by
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“leper” ships, that is, ships that are so unseaworthy that they pose substantial threat of
pollution by their mere presence in the territorial sea.

All such ships are considered by coastal states as security threats and, therefore, they seek
to characterize their mere presence in the territorial waters as non-innocent passage. This
appears to be very controversial since the LOSC innocent passage provisions concerning
such ships do not lend themselves to any such interpretation. However, it is arguable that
non-innocent passage would arise if the sole purpose of the ship is to wander about in the
ocean looking for a dumpsite.102

There is also the hanging issue of whether the coastal state may validly require foreign
ships passing through its territorial sea to carry equipment that would enable it to monitor
their movement therein. Some writers are of the opinion that nothing prevents the coastal
state from imposing such a measure if it so desires.103 However, it appears that the coastal
would be in violation of the LOSC if it were to turn away foreign ships from its territorial
waters by reason only of their failure to carry monitoring-enhancing implements.

It seems to be settled that submarines in innocent passage must navigate on the surface.
Indeed, “[t]his rule has been accepted for as long as submarines have been used as naval
vessels.”104 But the question has been asked whether submerged navigation of foreign
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submarines in the territorial sea of itself deprives such passage of innocence. Several
writers have argued that since the rule on submarines is contained in a separate article
other than article 19 which lists non-innocent activities, submerged navigation of foreign
submarines in the territorial sea, only amounts to an infringement of the coastal state’s
laws and regulations, and does not constitute non-innocent passage.105 According to
Froman:
The drafters could easily have included [the submarine] provision in the
[article 19] list of non-innocent activities. The failure to do so indicates the
drafters’ intention not to make surface operation a requirement of
innocence for submarines.106
This conclusion is perplexing. The incorporation of the rule in another article does not of
itself make such navigation innocent. Froman’s observation tends to uphold absolute
formalism devoid of reality and without regard to the purpose of the rule. Submarines are
by their nature crafts of stealth. They are designed to navigate undetected. They are used
mainly for military purposes to collect intelligence. Submerged navigation bears the mark
of secrecy and carries with it the attribute of high suspicion, hence the rule. If these
indices informing the rule do not speak of non-innocence, then nothing else would seem
good enough.

These hanging issues may be traced to the nature of the negotiations that preceded the
adoption of the LOSC. The negotiations were characterized largely by the patronization
of polarized interests between the maritime powers and coastal states. While the former
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pushed for greater navigation freedoms, the latter advocated for restricted access.107 The
quest for unrestricted freedom of navigation by the maritime powers resided in their
desire to control the seas to carry out their military operations and to enhance the lot of
their merchant fleets.108

Freedom of navigation in theory protects the rights of all states to the equal use of the
seas. But in practice it favours, to a great extent, the interests of the maritime powers,
especially with respect to military uses of the ocean.109 With this in mind, the coastal
states revolted against the old regime of freedom of navigation which was marked by
little restriction.110 In the words of Pirtle:
A combination of scientific discoveries of new oceanic resources and
rapid technological developments that enhanced capabilities for
exploitation of those resources…operated to weaken and eventually
invalidate the assumption that ocean resources were a “collective good”.
In consequence, the classical regime of freedom of the seas, which was
rooted in this ancient assumption, ceased to be viewed by coastal states as
being natural, equitable, or immutable.111
The protection of interests by both maritime powers on the one hand and coastal states on
the other hand feeds the most controversial issue on the subject, to wit, the innocent
passage of warships in the territorial sea. The controversy, as we will see shortly in the
next part, turns on whether such ships must notify the coastal state prior to passage and
whether such ships require the prior authorization of the coastal state for its passage in
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the territorial sea. No such requirements can be read into the clear wording of the
provisions of the LOSC. Therefore, the insistence on any such requirement would be in
violation of the LOSC. At this point, it is sufficient to say that prior notification is less
objectionable than prior authorization because the latter implies that there is nothing like
innocent passage for warships in the territorial zone.

However, warships, as the name implies, connote the presence of weapons and
ammunition aboard, and by reason of which the coastal state considers their presence in
the territorial sea as discomforting and a threat to its security. As Florsheim points out,
“[u]nlike the situation of merchant vessels, [in the case of warships] there is no
commercial interest involved and there may be danger at times to the nation whose
waters are being used.”112 The warship issue heavily dominated the negotiations leading
to the adoption of the LOSC. One author sums it up that:
Many delegates were engaged on both sides of this issue during the
general debates. All the debates proved that there was no middle ground
between the antagonists. For that reason, no accommodation of views was
possible through the medium of negotiation. In the closing days of the
Conference, Gabon offered a formal amendment to Article 21 to allow
coastal states to require prior authorization or notification for passage of
warships through the territorial sea. This proposal, of course, was
tenaciously opposed by the maritime states, and in the end, the amendment
was withdrawn (partially in response to a plea by the Conference President
for the withdrawal of all formal amendments to better enhance consensus)
in favour of a proposal to add a reference to “security” to the provision in
Article 21(1)(h), which gives coastal states the authority to enact laws
regarding customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary measures. To permit a
coastal state to enact laws preventing infringement of security regulations
would give such states extremely broad regulatory powers in the territorial
sea – not necessarily limited even to warships. This proposal was even
more strongly resisted. It therefore appeared imminent that the issue
would go to a vote in the plenary. At the last minute, however, the
sponsors of the proposal agreed to withdraw it in favour of a statement by
112
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the President of the Conference, on the record, that its withdrawal was
“without prejudice to the rights of the coastal states to adopt measures to
safeguard their security interests, in accordance with articles 19 and 25 of
this Convention.”113
Taken out of context, the statement of the President of the Conference appears to suggest
that he was stating his legal opinion on the effect of the withdrawal of the proposed
amendment in question. But in fact he was only stating the resolve of the sponsors of the
proposal.114 In any case, his statement cannot be taken as an invitation to restrict innocent
passage of warships in the territorial sea because it does not have the force of law.115

Both articles alluded to by the sponsors of that proposed amendment, do not in any way
support any preconditions for the innocent passage of warships. It is only when such
ships engage in any of the proscribed activities in article 19 that their passage may be
called into question. On the other hand, article 25 only envisages temporal suspension of
the right for security reasons and not the requisition of notification or the prior
authorization by the coastal state for the passage of such ships. To hold otherwise will be
giving effect to the notion that the mere presence of foreign warships in the territorial sea
is an offensive conduct. As it stands, the allusion to articles 19 and 25 to buttress the
113
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requirement of prior notification or authorization is “valid only for those states whose
opinion it expresses.”116

However, the circumstances under which the issue of innocent passage of warships was
negotiated suggest that the final provisions do not reflect the achievement of real
consensus. Therefore, it seems that many coastal states do not consider themselves bound
by the provisions of the LOSC on this issue. This is inherent in the resolve of the
sponsors of the Gabon proposal upon its withdrawal. Consequently, the matter appears to
be far from settled, having received no clear-cut answer117 and as “there seems to be a
general sense that the question is, for all practical purposes, best left without a clear
answer.”118 Having examined the innocent passage regime under the LOSC, we will next
turn our attention to contemporary state practice in its light.

Part III – Innocent Passage outside the Book
Whether owing to the wide and often inconclusive provisions of the LOSC on innocent
passage, or carry forward of pre-UNCLOS III ideological divide fever, there has not been
a uniform interpretation and application of the innocent passage provisions of the LOSC
by states.119
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We will commence our discussion with the practice of the United States and the Russian
Federation. The former being the only super-power and the latter being a recently retired
super-power. After years of inconsistent practice adopted by both states,120 sometimes
marked by open confrontation between them,121 these two nations finally adopted a
Uniform Interpretation122 of the innocent passage regime of the LOSC in 1989. Though
these rules are primarily intended to settle questions regarding innocent passage between
the two states, there is a veiled attempt at passing it off as a blue print to be followed by
the rest of the world.

Section 2 of the Uniform Interpretation seeks to put it beyond doubt that all ships,
including warships, enjoy the right of innocent passage in the territorial sea, without prior
notification or authorization. There is an attempt at reducing opportunity for
confrontation by requiring in section 8 that differences arising with respect to passage of
ships through the territorial sea should be settled by diplomatic means. Section 4 also
requires the coastal state to offer an opportunity to the ship (whose passage it questions)
to clarify its intentions or correct its conduct in a reasonably short time.
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This agreement appears to be keeping the peace between the two states with respect to
innocent passage. However, it is doubtful whether it has had any impact (as the two states
appear to hope for) on the rest of the world, especially on coastal states that seek to
unduly restrict innocent passage. For as one author observes, “[a]s state practice
evidences, this position of the major powers could be regarded as reflecting wishful
thinking rather than existing customary international law.”123 This is because many
coastal states place restrictions, seemingly unwarranted by the LOSC, on innocent
passage of ships in their territorial waters. What follows is an examination of some these
restrictions.

i) Restriction on Innocent Passage in General
It is now established beyond doubt that there exists the right of innocent passage by
foreign ships in the territorial waters of coastal states. However, in at least one case, this
assertion appears not to hold sway. By section 13 of Act No. 6169124 of the Republic of
Maldives, “save such vessels engaged in innocent passage compatible with international
laws, no vessel shall enter the territorial sea except in accordance with the laws and
regulations of Maldives.” This provision does not pose much difficulty. However,
immediately after this, section 14 sounds the knell that:
no foreign vessel shall enter the EEZ of Maldives except with prior
authorization from the Government of Maldives in accordance with the
laws of Maldives.
It is very difficult to reconcile these two provisions. It appears that the purpose of section
14 is to prevent unauthorized fishing in the EEZ. But its formulation is no doubt
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unpalatable since it has the effect of denying the existence of freedom of navigation in
the EEZ, which includes the territorial sea. Even if we are to stretch language and assert
that section 14 does not apply to the territorial sea, the geophysical nature of Maldives
(an archipelago) dictates that one can only access its territorial sea via the EEZ. The
restriction on passage through the EEZ (which is itself in violation of the LOSC, but not
the subject matter of this paper) extends inevitably to the territorial sea. It is submitted
that section 14 is objectionable on every ground since it is against all tenets of freedom of
navigation.

Another restriction of concern here is the declaration by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
that innocent passage does not apply in its territorial waters where there is a route to the
high seas or an EEZ that is equally suitable as regards navigational and hydrographic
features.125

ii) Environment Based Restriction
As should be expected, many coastal states have passed legislations concerning the
preservation of the marine environment which inevitably impact on the right of innocent
passage. A few of these legislations deserve our comment.

It may be recalled that engaging in an act of willful and serious pollution would render
passage non-innocent under article 19(2)(h). We have pointed out the unsatisfactory state
of this provision owing to the relativity of the word “serious” though it clearly points to
the fact that the pollution in question must be of a grave magnitude. However, several
125
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states have dropped the requirement of “serious” altogether in their domestic laws and
regulations. For instance, under Polish126 and Croat127 laws, an act of deliberate or willful
pollution of the marine environment simpliciter would render passage non-innocent.
Therefore, under these two laws the gravity of the pollution is inconsequential.

In the case of Bahamas128 and Belize,129 passage is non-innocent if the polluting act in
question is calculated to or is likely to cause damage to the state, its resources or marine
environment. In these instances, the overriding consideration is simply the mere
likelihood of damage. Iranian law130 is even more restrictive. It goes further to drop the
mens rea requirement by stipulating that passage is non-innocent if a ship passing
through its territorial waters engages simply in any act of pollution of the marine
environment contrary to the laws of Iran. There is no requirement that the pollution be
willful.

Nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying nuclear or other ultra hazardous substances
have borne the brunt of unwarranted restrictions by many coastal states. Djibouti,131
Pakistan,132 Malta,133 UAE,134 and South Korea135 all require prior notification from such
ships before they may be allowed passage through the territorial sea. On the other hand,
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Egypt,136 Oman,137 Iran,138 Yemen,139 Saudi Arabia,140 Malaysia,141 Maldives142 and
Seychelles143 require permission or authorization for the passage of such ships in their
territorial waters. Romania144 and Lithuania145 prohibit the passage through their
territorial waters, of ships carrying nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

The transboundary transport of hazardous waste has generated interesting responses from
some coastal states. A good example is Haiti. On September 5 1986, the Khian Sea, a
Liberian registered vessel, set sail from Philadelphia, wandering the oceans in search of a
dump site for its cargo of approximately 14,000 tons of incinerator trash. After being
turned away from Bahamas, Bermuda, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Guinea-Bissau,
and the Netherlands Antilles, it called at Gonaives, Haiti in December 1987. It convinced
the Haitian authorities that it was carrying fertilizer. After unleashing 4,000 tons of the
ash on a Gonaives beach, it was ordered to reload and leave. The Khian Sea left but
without its noxious cargo that remained where it fell.146

In apparent response to the Khian Sea incident, Haiti has strictly prohibited the passage
through its territorial sea of vessels transporting wastes, refuse, residues, or any other
materials likely to endanger the health of its population and to pollute the marine, air and
136
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land environment.147 To underline the seriousness it attaches to this prohibition, it added
that it will use all means within its power to prevent any attempt to dump wastes (toxic or
non-toxic) in any part of Haiti.

It may also be recalled that in November 1992 Japan embarked upon plutonium
shipments from France to Japan. The coastal states along the possible routes of these
shipments, protested angrily and some openly declared that they would prevent such
shipments through their territorial seas and EZZs.148

The above legislations, declarations, claims and measures are clearly not mandated by the
LOSC. However, the grave risk of environmental degradation posed by the ships that are
the subject of the undue restrictions would seem to suggest that these coastal states are
acting in a responsible manner to protect their legitimate interests. This is so when
viewed against the fact that the coastal states in most instances derive no benefit (direct
or indirect) from the passage of such ships in their territorial waters.

iii) Restriction on Innocent Passage of Warships
The saga of innocent passage of warships through the territorial sea continues unabated.
Many coastal states have taken a negative stance on the issue by stipulating restrictions in
violation of the LOSC. These range from the requirement of prior notification, prior
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permission or authorization to the specification of the maximum permitted number of
warships.149

It appears that at present Croatia,150 Egypt,151 Finland,152 Guyana,153 India,154 South
Korea,155 Libya,156 Malta,157 Mauritius,158 and the former Yugoslavia (now Serbia and
Montenegro)159 require prior notification for the passage of foreign warships through
their territorial waters. Most of these states do not specify the time requirements for such
notification. It may, therefore, be assumed that a foreign warship desirous of passing
through their territorial waters may communicate its desire to the coastal state in question
moments before actual passage. Croatia and the former Yugoslavia require not less than
24 hours prior notice while South Korea requires a much longer period of 3 days prior
notification.

It also appears that at present Algeria,160 Antigua and Barbuda,161 Bangladesh,162
Barbados,163 Burma,164 Cambodia,165 Cape Verde,166 China,167 Congo (Brazzaville),168
149
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Grenada,169 Iran,170 Maldives,171 Oman,172 Pakistan,173 Philippines,174 Romania,175 St
Vincent and the Grenadines,176 Seychelles,177 Somalia,178 Sri Lanka,179 Sudan,180 Syria,181
UAE,182 Vietnam183 and Yemen184 all require prior permission or authorization for the
passage of foreign warships in their territorial waters. Albania requires special
authorization for the passage of such ships, except in the circumstances of force
majeure.185 The former Yugoslavia restricts the number of foreign warships of the same
nationality passing through its territorial sea at a time to a maximum of 3. Denmark also
stipulates that simultaneous passage through the Great Belt or the Sound of more than 3
warships of the same nationality is subject to prior notification through diplomatic
channels.186
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Few of these coastal state legislations define what is meant by warship. Therefore, it may
safely be assumed that they refer to the LOSC definition. The cited legislations of the
former Yugoslavia and Croatia contain definitions of warship that are not dissimilar to
that of the LOSC. The Republic of Maldives defines warships as “naval vessels of such
description that could be engaged in warfare due to the weapons on board such
vessels.”187 The express reference in this definition to weapons suggests that ships that fit
the LOSC definition but not actually fitted with weapons on board are not covered. If that
is the case then the Maldivian definition is narrower in scope than that of the LOSC.

Apart from these definitions of warship, the cited legislations, claims, and declarations of
the various coastal states point to the irresistible conclusion that these states do not
recognize innocent passage with respect to warships. The various restrictions
undoubtedly violate the LOSC since it admits of no such restrictions in its provisions.
However, there is no sign that these states would roll back their claims and restrictions.188
Indeed, in the case of Seychelles, it has actually tightened its 1977 requirement of prior
notification to prior authorization.189

The restrictions placed on innocent passage of warships in the territorial sea by so many
coastal states are excused on the ground of fighting “maritime hegemony”190 by the
maritime states. The United States has been challenging these excessive restrictions
187
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through its Freedom of Navigation (FON) program established in 1979 by the Carter
Administration. This program is intended to emphasize the freedom of navigation
provisions of the LOSC.191 It is maintained that “[u]nless these excessive claims are
actively opposed, the challenged rights will be effectively lost.”192 True it is that
acquiescence in the face of these restrictions has the effect of opening “the door for everincreasing restrictions.”193 Moreover, the United States at the moment appears to be the
state possessing the capability to effectively challenge these restrictions. However, its
persistent refusal to ratify the LOSC robs it of the moral backing for this cause.

Conclusion
The exact scope of the right of innocent passage has, over the years, been reflected in
accepted state practice. Though steeped in antiquity, the concept is as relevant today as it
was some centuries ago. There has been a brave and commendable attempt by the
international community to settle finally the juridical nature of the concept. However, the
nature of this right appears to defy permanent answers to its myriad riddles. As we have
seen, many coastal states are placing excessive limitations on this right while
conveniently shutting their minds to the time honored pacta sunt servanda principle.194

One thing is clear. The strife for mastery between mare liberum and mare clausum
continues unabated. This friction will forever be the main factor that will shape the
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development of the law of the sea in general and the right of innocent passage in
particular. If, heavy and water logged, it sank in troubled waters during the time of James
Brown Scott,195 recent state practice appears to suggest that John Selden’s Mare Clausum
is riding buoyantly on the waves – side by side Grotius’ Mare Liberum.

However, it is submitted that freedom of navigation must prevail. Our world of
interdependence would have it no other way. States must streamline their domestic laws
with the view of making them LOSC compliant. We must strife for uniformity in state
practice in this vein - if for nothing, at least to reduce the opportunity for violent
confrontation. Unilateral action only breeds instability and sour international relations.
Reciprocity should inform the actions of states. Perhaps the biblical injunction that we
should love our neighbors as ourselves, finds no better expression than in this.
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